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Note 
 
Confronting Victims: Why the Statements of 
Young Victims of Heinous Crimes Must Still Be 
Subject to Cross-Examination  
Joseph Meyer*
Orlando Manuel Bobadilla does not make a very sympa-
thetic defendant: he was charged with first-degree sexual as-
sault of a three-year-old boy.
 
1 At his trial, Bobadilla was identi-
fied by statements that the victim gave to a child-protection 
social worker during a previous interview.2 However, because of 
a Minnesota statute that allows out-of-court statements of 
child-victims to be used in court, Bobadilla never had an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the victim.3 The well-intentioned stat-
ute was designed to protect child-victims of these sorts of of-
fenses from being further traumatized by having to face their 
abusers in court. But it meant that Bobadilla could not ask the 
victim questions to establish the certainty of the identification 
or to pose any questions regarding a motive to lie, improper in-
fluence, or confusion.4 Rather than having the jury assess the 
victim’s credibility, the judge alone decided that the victim’s 
statements bore sufficient “indicia of reliability.”5
 
*  J.D. Candidate 2014, M.B.A. 2013, University of Minnesota. I would 
like to thank the staff and editors of the Minnesota Law Review, especially 
Emily Peterson, Morgan Helme, and Jacob Rhein, for all of the editorial sup-
port that has gone into this Note. Additionally, I would like to thank Craig 
Roen, Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School, for 
his guidance on topic selection and his feedback on numerous drafts of this 
Note. Finally, for a lifetime of love and support, I would like to thank Pat Fos-
ter, Charles Meyer, Lisa Meyer, Rachel Hoffart, and T.J. Houk. Copyright 
© 2014 by Joseph Meyer. 
 While the de-
fendant was unable to challenge the identifying party’s asser-
tions, Bobadilla was also not allowed to attempt to prove his 
 1. State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Minn. 2006). 
 2. Id. at 247–48. 
 3. Id. at 248. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See id. at 256. 
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innocence by offering evidence of his own consistent denials be-
cause that would be impermissible hearsay.6 The jury subse-
quently found Bobadilla guilty, and he was sentenced to twelve 
years in prison for first-degree criminal sexual conduct.7
As a general principle, the right of a defendant like Boba-
dilla to confront the witnesses against him is guaranteed by the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him.”
  
8 A number of states 
have passed statutes carving out exceptions for child-victims of 
certain violent offenses when a judge determines that the 
statements meet some standard of reliability.9 These statutes 
were consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Ohio v. Roberts so long as there was either a showing 
that the witness was “unavailable” or that the statements bore 
“adequate indicia of reliability.”10 However, in 2004, the Su-
preme Court overturned Roberts in Crawford v. Washington, 
holding that all so-called “testimonial” statements (in other 
words, witness statements obtained for the purpose of prosecut-
ing the accused) in criminal cases requires that the defendant 
not be deprived of his right to cross-examination.11 Further-
more, the statutes are problematic because the jury, and not 
the judge, is responsible for assessing the credibility of evi-
dence.12
 
 6. Id. at 256–57. 
 
 7. Id. at 246. 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 9. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subdiv. 3 (2013) (providing that “[a]n 
out-of-court statement made by a child under the age of ten years . . . alleging, 
explaining, denying, or describing any act of sexual conduct or penetration 
performed with or on the child” will be admissible “as substantive evidence” 
even if otherwise prohibited provided that the child either testifies or “is una-
vailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act”); WIS. 
STAT. § 908.08(3) (2012) (requiring that the “time, content and circumstances 
of the statement provide indicia of its trustworthiness”).  
 10. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 11. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52, 68–69 (2004) 
(“Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability 
sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actual-
ly prescribes: confrontation.”). 
 12. See MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST. 
COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 3.04 (Jud. Comm. on Model Jury Instruc-
tions for the Eighth Circuit, rev. ed. 2013) [hereinafter EIGHTH CIRCUIT MAN-
UAL] (“In deciding what the facts are, you may have to decide what testimony 
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This Note will discuss the implications of Crawford and its 
progeny for these so-called victim protection statutes. Part I 
discusses the current state of Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence, as well as policy considerations behind laws shielding 
children from having to testify in certain types of cases. Part II 
analyzes how those laws are inconsistent with both the Con-
frontation Clause as well as the role of the jury as fact-finder. 
Ultimately, Part III of this Note proposes that the offending 
statutes should be revised to make them consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s Crawford line of decisions either by providing 
for live, two-way video testimony or by limiting the scope of the 
statutes. 
I.  CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE   
This Part outlines the Ohio v. Roberts decision, which pro-
vided the guidelines for admitting hearsay evidence against 
criminal defendants. It goes on to show how one United States 
Supreme Court case turned Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence on its head. Finally, it demonstrates how courts have 
dealt with statutes addressing out-of-court testimony of child-
victims and discusses the role of the jury as fact-finder in trials. 
A. OHIO V. ROBERTS 
In 1980, in Roberts, the United States Supreme Court is-
sued a landmark ruling in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. 
The Court considered whether hearsay evidence may be admit-
ted against a criminal defendant.13 In that case, a man named 
Herschel Roberts was charged with check forgery.14 Roberts 
claimed that Anita Isaacs, an acquaintance of the defendant, 
allowed him to use her parents’ checkbook. Roberts was con-
victed largely based on transcripts made when defense counsel 
questioned Isaacs at a preliminary hearing and she contradict-
ed Roberts’s claims.15 The Court held that the Confrontation 
Clause bears upon hearsay in two ways. First, the framers 
showed a preference for face-to-face confrontation.16
 
you believe and what testimony you do not believe. You may believe all of 
what a witness said, or only part of it, or none of it.”). 
 Second, in 
 13. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62–63.  
 14. Id. at 58. 
 15. Id. at 58–60. 
 16. See id. at 65 (“In the usual case (including cases where prior cross-
examination has occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or demon-
strate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use 
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the event that a witness is unavailable, hearsay evidence can 
only be used if it bears some indicia of reliability.17 “Reliability 
can be inferred . . . where the evidence falls within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be 
excluded . . . absent . . . particularized guarantees of trustwor-
thiness.”18 The Roberts Court concluded that judges (and not 
the jury) would be responsible for determining whether there 
were sufficient indicia of reliability in order to weigh the evi-
dence.19
B. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: CRAWFORD AND AFTER 
 
Roberts did not stand forever, though, as the Supreme 
Court made a decision that significantly altered the landscape 
of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Tremors caused by that 
decision were felt almost immediately. 
1. Crawford 
Twenty-four years after Roberts, the United States Su-
preme Court reexamined the Confrontation Clause and its ap-
plication to out-of-court statements offered at trial for prosecu-
tion purposes. In Crawford v. Washington, defendant Michael 
Crawford was charged with stabbing the man who attempted to 
rape his wife, Sylvia.20 At trial, the prosecution played a record-
ed pretrial statement of Sylvia because marital privilege would 
have precluded her from testifying in court.21 Crawford was 
subsequently convicted.22 The Supreme Court held that using 
Sylvia Crawford’s transcript against her husband violated the 
Confrontation Clause.23
 
against the defendant.” (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Barber 
v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968))).  
 Justice Scalia observed that previous 
rationales applied by the Court had been unfaithful to the his-
 17. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65–66 (allowing for certain hearsay evidence to be 
admitted when the circumstances around the collecting of the evidence estab-
lish the truth of the hearsay and therefore do not prejudice the defense when 
the defense is unable to cross-examine the witness); see also Mattox v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) (holding that evidence resting on such a solid 
foundation ensures that the defense still receives the “substance of the consti-
tutional protection”). 
 18. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004). 
 21. Id. at 38–40. 
 22. Id. at 41. 
 23. Id. at 68. 
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torical underpinnings of Confrontation rights.24 While Roberts 
had focused on historically recognized hearsay exceptions and 
indicia of reliability, the Crawford Court asserted that use of 
“indicia of reliability” is inconsistent with the spirit of the Con-
frontation Clause.25 Against this backdrop, the Court held that 
the Confrontation Clause was not subordinate to rules of evi-
dence and a judge’s subjective assessment of whether the evi-
dence bore “indicia of reliability.”26 The Court held that states 
could develop their own hearsay laws to deal with so-called 
non-testimonial evidence, but that all testimonial hearsay 
would be inadmissible as a matter of law when offered against 
a criminal defendant.27 Under this ruling, for the Confrontation 
Clause to be implicated under Crawford, there would have to 
be a showing that the declarant was not testifying and that the 
statements were testimonial.28 In a foreshadowing of the confu-
sion that was to ensue as a result of the Supreme Court’s dis-
tinction between testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay, Jus-
tice Scalia stated that “[w]e leave for another day any effort to 
spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”29 The 
court did give some limited guidance as to what constituted 
“testimonial” hearsay: it included (1) ex parte in-court testimo-
ny, (2) formalized extrajudicial statements, and (3) statements 
made to be a substitute for in-court testimony.30
 
 24. Id. at 60. 
 The Court also 
enumerated several types of hearsay which are always testi-
 25. Id. The Court’s objections to the Roberts test were twofold. First, the 
test is too broad because it “applies the same mode of analysis whether or not 
the hearsay consists of ex parte testimony. This often results in close constitu-
tional scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the core concerns of the 
Clause.” Id. Second, the test is too narrow because it “admits statements 
that do consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere finding of reliability.” Id. 
 26. Id. at 61–62. Justice Scalia used scathing language to criticize the use 
of such indicia, stating that “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimo-
ny is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defend-
ant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.” 
Id. at 62. 
 27. Id. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly con-
sistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their devel-
opment of hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that ex-
empted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether. 
Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment de-
mands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination.”). 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. at 51–52. 
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monial: “Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a mini-
mum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a 
grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”31
2. Crawford’s Progeny
 
32
Two years later, in Davis v. Washington, the United States 
Supreme Court had an opportunity to shed further light on 
what was meant by the word “testimonial.” In that case, Adrian 
Davis was charged with violating a protective order against his 
ex-girlfriend.
 
33 Some of the most damaging evidence against 
him was a recording of his ex-girlfriend’s 911 call.34 The Court 
articulated a standard for distinguishing between testimonial 
and non-testimonial hearsay statements: “Statements are 
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation 
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency.”35 The Court went on to hold that 
statements are testimonial when “the circumstances objectively 
indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove 
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”36 
In Davis, the Court found that the 911 operator was gathering 
facts from the witness to deal with the emergency rather than 
fact-finding about past events in order to prove a charge.37 By 
contrast, the Court found that statements identifying a defend-
ant to law enforcement officials in a companion case, Hammon 
v. State,38 were inadmissible.39
 
 31. Id. at 68. 
 These statements were testimo-
 32. Several cases interpreting Crawford were not included in this Note 
because they were not germane to the arguments made within it. See, e.g., 
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 
557 U.S. 305 (2009); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).  
 33. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 818 (2006).  
 34. Id. at 817–19. 
 35. Id. at 822. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 827–28.  
 38. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 457 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Da-
vis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).  
 39. Davis, 547 U.S. at 832 (finding that it was immaterial that the state-
ments in Hammon were in response to initial inquiries made at the crime sce-
ne because they were “neither a cry for help nor the provision of information 
enabling officers immediately to end a threatening situation”).  
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nial because they were made after the emergency was over.40 
The Davis Court then remanded Hammon for another trial 
without the inadmissible evidence.41
In 2011, in Michigan v. Bryant, the Court again had to 
clarify what made statements testimonial. In that case, a man 
named Richard Bryant was found guilty of murder after he was 
identified by a dying declaration that his victim made to po-
lice.
 
42 The Court stated it would use an “objective” standard to 
assess the purpose of a statement by examining the surround-
ing circumstances to decide what a reasonable person would 
understand the purpose of the question to be.43 In a departure 
from the Crawford discussion, which included in its definition 
of “testimonial” statements those statements where the intent 
of the person answering the question is to create a substitute 
for in-court testimony,44 this decision seemed to focus on the 
primary purpose of the police in obtaining the statement.45 Af-
ter applying that standard to the case, the Supreme Court 
found the victim was primarily helping police respond to the 
ongoing emergency rather than aiding a later prosecution.46
In that same year, the Supreme Court again examined the 
Confrontation Clause in Bullcoming v. New Mexico.
 
47
 
 40. Id. The Court also approved Hammon’s dicta that a 911 interrogation 
innocently begun can “evolve into testimonial statements.” Id. at 828 (quoting 
Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 457) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Donald 
Bullcoming was charged with driving while intoxicated and 
 41. Id. at 834. 
 42. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011). 
 43. Id. at 1156. The standard by which the purpose is measured is an ob-
jective standard. Id. It can be derived from the circumstances including the 
time, location, and questions asked, but it is based on what a reasonable per-
son would understand the purposes of the questioner to be and not on the ac-
tual subjective intent of the questioner. Id. One of the most important factors 
to be considered when assessing the primary purpose is whether or not there 
is an ongoing emergency that the police are responding to. Id. at 1157. An on-
going emergency can expand beyond threats to the witness and extend to oth-
er potential victims and responders. Id. at 1158. Another important question 
is the formality of the setting. Id. at 1160. A formal setting will almost always 
suggest the absence of an ongoing emergency, but an informal setting is not 
enough to suggest the absence of an emergency. Id. The content of the discus-
sion can also be probative of the purpose of the questioning. Id. at 1160–61. 
Considering that a severely injured victim may have no purpose in answering 
the questions is permissible and does not mean that the Court is conducting a 
subjective inquiry. Id. at 1161. 
 44. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004). 
 45. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155. 
 46. Id. at 1166–67. 
 47. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011). 
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convicted largely because of a forensic laboratory report show-
ing his blood-alcohol concentration levels.48 The test was per-
formed by an analyst named Caylor, but the State called a dif-
ferent analyst to validate the report during trial because Caylor 
was on unpaid leave.49 The Court, relying in part on the under-
standing that the lab report was made in a formal setting, 
found that admitting the report without the maker testifying 
violated Bullcoming’s Confrontation Clause rights.50 The Court 
found that the State had failed to establish that unpaid leave 
made Caylor truly “unavailable.”51 Justice Sotomayor con-
curred, finding that the formality of the statement was proba-
tive of testimonial hearsay, and that the report therefore 
should not have been admitted, because it was an attempt to 
get into evidence hearsay obtained by law enforcement for the 
purpose of prosecuting the defendant.52 Any time something is 
created for that purpose, according to the Court’s precedents, it 
is testimonial by nature.53
These cases have left ambiguity as to what it means for 
hearsay to be testimonial. The Davis Court did focus on three 
factors to consider when deciding whether a statement is tes-
timonial: (1) whether the focus is on past or present events, (2) 
whether the purpose of the statement was to aid in the investi-
gation of a crime, and (3) the formality of the statements.
  
54
C. STATE STATUTES INTENDED TO PROTECT CHILD-VICTIMS 
FROM THE TRAUMA OF CONFRONTING THEIR ABUSERS 
 
However, despite these factors, there is still ambiguity as to 
what kind of hearsay may be constitutionally admitted. 
Many states have laws that allow law enforcement inter-
views with child-victims of certain crimes to be admitted with-
out subjecting the victims to cross-examination.55
 
 48. Id. at 2709. 
 Many of these 
laws require that the victim be a child below a certain cutoff 
 49. Id. at 2710–12. 
 50. Id. at 2717 (pointing out that the certificate Caylor created and signed 
was part of a formal process that is suggestive of testimonial evidence). 
 51. Id. at 2714. 
 52. Id. at 2720–21 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 53. Id. at 2721 (“I am compelled to conclude that the report has a ‘primary 
purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony,’ which ren-
ders it testimonial.” (citation omitted) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 
1143, 1155 (2011))). 
 54. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826–27 (2006). 
 55. See supra note 9. 
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age, that the crime be a certain category of assault or sexual 
abuse, and that the circumstances of the statements give some 
indication of the trustworthiness of the testimony.56 These laws 
admitting allegations of criminal behavior have their roots in 
the common law, when prompt complaints of criminal conduct 
were admissible as part of the “hue and cry” requirement of vio-
lent crimes.57 The law assumed that if a person really was an 
unwilling victim of a violent crime, then the victim would 
promptly report the offense.58
This section will describe the state of these statutes in 
Minnesota, Wisconsin, and California and will also discuss the 
role of the jury in assessing witness credibility. Minnesota, 
Wisconsin, and California are used as examples of these laws 
because they are similar to laws that other states have
  
59
1. Minnesota’s Statute 
 and 
also illustrate the different forms that the laws can take.  
Minnesota law provides that “[a]n out-of-court statement 
made by a child under the age of ten years . . . alleging, explain-
ing, denying, or describing any act of sexual conduct or pene-
tration performed with or on the child” will be admissible “as 
substantive evidence,” even if otherwise prohibited, provided 
that the child either testifies or “is unavailable as a witness 
and there is corroborative evidence of the act.”60
Minnesota courts addressed the statute several times after 
Roberts but before Crawford.
 
61 In State v. Bellotti, for example, 
Anthony Bellotti appealed from his conviction of sexually as-
saulting two girls.62 The Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed 
whether a child’s out-of-court statements to a doctor in a hospi-
tal about Bellotti’s conduct were admissible in a second-degree 
criminal sexual conduct case.63
 
 56. See supra note 
 This case provides a good exam-
9. 
 57. Charles W. Ehrhardt & Ryon M. McCabe, Child Sexual Abuse Prose-
cutions: Admitting Out-of-Court Statements of Child Victims and Witnesses in 
Louisiana, 23 S.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1995). 
 58. See id.  
 59. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 92.53(1) (2014) (allowing for videotaped state-
ments of victims under age sixteen to be used as a substitute for in-court tes-
timony). 
 60. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subdiv. 3 (2013). 
 61. See, e.g., State v. Cole, 594 N.W.2d 197, 198–99 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999); 
State v. Hollander, 590 N.W.2d 341, 345–48 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
 62. State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). 
 63. Id. at 310–11. 
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ple of how Minnesota courts measure the indicia of reliability. 
The following factors were considered: opportunity to commit 
the crime, absence of a motive for the victims to lie, spontaneity 
of the statements, absence of a long interrogation or leading 
questions, use of age appropriate terminology by the victim, re-
luctance to speak with men about the crime, consistency of the 
statements, spontaneity of the initial disclosure, length of time 
between the assault and the statement to the police, and if the 
victim agrees with everything asked of her.64 The court applied 
the test articulated in Roberts and found that, by virtue of be-
ing declared incompetent, the witness was unavailable and 
there were indicia of reliability.65 In a very short discussion, the 
court found the statute facially constitutional.66
In Bobadilla v. Carlson, discussed in the Introduction of 
this Note and decided after Crawford, a federal district court in 
Minnesota assessed whether it was a constitutional violation to 
admit a videotaped statement given by a child-victim to a social 
worker working at the behest of a police officer.
 However, the 
court’s finding of facial constitutionality is of little consequence 
now because this case did not consider the more recent Craw-
ford decision prohibiting testimonial hearsay. 
67 The court 
found that statements taken during the course of police inter-
rogations were testimonial by definition and therefore per se 
inadmissible as hearsay.68
2. Wisconsin’s Statute 
 This holding is in direct conflict with 
the language of the statute that would leave it to the court to 
determine the admissibility of such a testimonial statement, 
even absent the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 
Therefore, the statute should be found to be facially unconstitu-
tional. 
Wisconsin has a similar statute that allows for a court to 
“admit into evidence the audiovisual recording of an oral 
statement of a child who is available to testify.”69
 
 64. Id. at 312–13. 
 The statute 
 65. Id. at 315. 
 66. Id. at 314–15. 
 67. Bobadilla v. Carlson, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1099–100 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 68. Id. at 1104 (“[T]he Supreme Court was absolutely clear that 
‘[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations’ are ‘testi-
monial’ and cannot be admitted unless the declarant is unavailable and the 
defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” (quoting 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004))). 
 69. WIS. STAT. § 908.08(1) (2012). 
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uses similar “indicia of reliability” language when it allows for 
a court to determine whether “the time, content and circum-
stances of the statement provide indicia of its trustworthi-
ness.”70
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals examined the statute’s 
constitutionality in the pre-Crawford decision State v. Taranti-
no.
 
71 In that case, Louis Tarantino appealed his conviction for 
sexually assaulting his three stepdaughters.72 The evidence 
against Tarantino included audiovisual recorded testimony of 
the three victims from a pre-trial hearing.73 On its face, the 
case does not implicate Crawford, as the defense had the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the victim-witnesses at the pre-trial 
hearing and at trial under the Wisconsin statute, even though 
the state did not pursue direct examination at trial.74 Tarantino 
appealed both the facial constitutionality of the statute75 as 
well as the constitutionality of the trial court’s application of 
that statute.76
Nevertheless, Tarantino alleged that his due process rights 
were violated.
  
77 He argued that since the state was not required 
to produce the children for live direct examination, his ability 
to cross-examine them as guaranteed by the Confrontation 
clause was conditioned upon compelling the child victim-
witnesses to appear in court, something which would hurt him 
in the eyes of the jury.78 The court was not persuaded by this 
argument. It found that the built-in cross-examination proce-
dures “satisfie[d] substantive due process.”79 The court further 
pointed out that there were other examples of hearsay excep-
tions when the declarant was available.80 However, Tarantino 
was decided fourteen years before Crawford overturned many 
of those exceptions.81
 
 70. Id. § 908.08(2)(d). 
 
 71. State v. Tarantino, 458 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 
 72. Id. at 584. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 585. 
 75. Id. at 587–89. 
 76. Id. at 589–90. 
 77. Id. at 588.  
 78. Id. He asserted that the choice between not being able to cross-
examine the witnesses and looking unsympathetic to the victims by calling 
them as witnesses “place[d] him in a Catch-22.” Id.  
 79. Id. at 589. 
 80. Id.  
 81. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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Tarantino also argued that since the testimony came from 
a pretrial hearing where the burden of proof was probable 
cause and the credibility of the witnesses could not be chal-
lenged, the court had impermissibly lowered the state’s burden 
of proof from beyond a reasonable doubt to probable cause.82 
The court found the instruction telling the jury that they must 
find the defendant guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt” in order 
to convict was sufficient to address any burden of proof issues 
raised by the defendant.83
In the year before Crawford, in State v. Snider, that same 
statute again came before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
 
84 
Robert Snider appealed his conviction of first-degree sexual as-
sault of a child.85 In an interview with a social worker recorded 
by a detective, the child-victim recounted the assault.86 At trial, 
the state decided to use the recording after the victim-witness 
failed to recount the events in the same level of detail while on 
the stand as in the recording and omitted some important de-
tails.87 Snider argued that the admission of the video was im-
proper.88 The court upheld the trial court’s finding that “the 
statement possessed ‘circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi-
ness.’”89 The factors considered in determining “trustworthi-
ness” included age-appropriate knowledge of sexuality, a desire 
to not talk about certain body parts, the lack of indication of 
deceit in the video, the consistency of the video with the state-
ment given by the victim to the guidance counselor, and the 
consistency of the video with the statement that Snider himself 
gave to the detective.90
Snider may not seem to raise a Crawford issue since the 
child actually appeared at trial. However, under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, a witness is “unavailable” if that witness 
 
 
 82. Tarantino, 458 N.W.2d at 589–90. 
 83. Id. at 590 (internal quotation marks omitted). This case makes for an-
other interesting comparison. Crawford only requires an opportunity to cross-
examine, and does not specify whether it must have been in a setting with the 
same burden of proof as the criminal trial. 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004). 
 84. State v. Snider, 668 N.W.2d 784, 788 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). 
 85. Id. at 787. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 788 (“Despite leading questions from the prosecution, the victim 
left out some of the alleged touching she had described during the taped inter-
view.”).  
 88. Id. at 791. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 792. 
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“testifies to not remembering the subject matter.”91
3. California’s Statute 
 Thus, the 
witness’s unavailability was arguably analogous to not being 
present.  
California also has a statute providing for the out-of-court 
statements of victims of child abuse or child neglect to be ad-
mitted at trial.92 For the statement to be admitted, the court 
must find “in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the 
jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the state-
ment provide sufficient indicia of reliability.”93 Additionally, the 
child must either be able to testify or be shown unavailable to 
testify.94 In the second instance, there must be some form of 
corroborating evidence of the crime to indicate the truthfulness 
of the statement.95
The Court of Appeal for the Sixth District in California ap-
plied this statute in People v. Harless.
 
96 Robert Harless ap-
pealed his conviction for lewd acts on children under fourteen 
as well as sexual assault on children under fourteen.97 Included 
in the evidence against Harless were out-of-court statements 
made to a social worker by one of the victims in an interview 
arranged by a detective.98 Harless argued that those statements 
were inadmissible under Crawford because the witness was 
unable to remember99 what she had said or to whom she had 
said it, so he did not have a meaningful opportunity to cross-
examine her.100 An opportunity to conduct “meaningful” cross-
examination is guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause.101
 
 91. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3). 
 The 
court held that use of the prior inconsistent statement was 
proper because the witness’s inability to recall every detail did 
 92. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360(a) (West Supp. 2014). 
 93. Id. § 1360(a)(2). 
 94. Id. § 1360(a)(3). 
 95. Id. 
 96. People v. Harless, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 97. Id. at 628. 
 98. Id. at 631. 
 99. Making the witness “unavailable” under Federal Rule of Evidence 
804(a)(3). 
 100. Harless, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 636. 
 101. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 562 (1988) (showing that 
certain circumstances can “undermine the process” of cross-examination, ren-
dering it not meaningful).  
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not render the cross-examination ineffective.102 Further, since 
the witness was present, there was nothing improper about im-
peaching her in-court testimony with prior out-of-court incon-
sistent statements.103
D. ROLE OF THE JURY 
 
Another issue that must be considered when assessing the 
permissibility of statutes allowing for out-of-court testimony is 
the role of the jury. As has been discussed, the state statutes 
call for courts to look to the circumstances surrounding out-of-
court statements by young victims and assess their reliabil-
ity.104 In Crawford, Justice Scalia felt that judges were usurp-
ing the role of the jury by making their own judgments about 
“indicia of reliability” when he compared the use of the stand-
ard to eliminating jury trials in their entirety.105
The role of the jury when assessing witness statements, ac-
cording to the Eighth Circuit’s Model Criminal Jury Instruc-
tions, is to determine the credibility of that testimony.
  
106 The 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit examined the applica-
tion of these jury instructions in a pre-Crawford decision in 
United States v. Butler,107 in which Carl Butler appealed his 
conviction of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor.108 The child 
victim-witness testified against Butler in the jury trial.109 
The trial court issued this jury instruction: “In deciding what 
the facts are, you may have to decide what testimo-
ny you believe and what testimony you do not believe. You may 
believe all of what a witness said, or only part of it, or none of 
it.”110
  [Y]ou are the sole judge of the credibility of a child who testifies. 
You may consider not only the child’s age, but . . . whether the child 
impresses you as having an accurate memory and recollection, 
 The appellate court also approved the trial court’s use of 
the following jury instruction:  
 
 102. Harless, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 636–37. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Supra Part I.C.1–3. 
 105. Supra note 26. 
 106. EIGHTH CIRCUIT MANUAL, supra note 12, § 3.04 (“In deciding what the 
facts are, you may have to decide what testimony you believe and what testi-
mony you do not believe. You may believe all of what a witness said, or only 
part of it, or none of it.”). 
 107. United States v. Butler, 56 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 108. Id. at 942–43. 
 109. Id. at 943. 
 110. Id. at 945 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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whether the child impresses you as a truth-telling individual, and any 
other facts and circumstances which impress you as significant in de-
termining the credibility of the child.111
Butler argued that the special instruction regarding the child-
witness lent extra credence to the testimony, thereby unfairly 
“bolstering the credibility of the child-witness in this case.”
  
112 
The appellate court held that the trial court did not give any 
undue credence to the child’s testimony, but simply correctly 
pointed out that the child’s testimony deserved the same con-
sideration as other testimony and that the jury should deter-
mine the witness’s credibility.113
The Minnesota District Judges Association took a similar 
stance on the role of the jury when it stated in its jury instruc-
tions that “[y]ou are the sole judges of whether a witness is to 
be believed and of the weight to be given to a witness’s testi-
mony.”
 
114
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause has evolved with the Crawford decision erasing decades 
of jurisprudence under the Roberts standard. Many states allow 
out-of-court statements into evidence against criminal defend-
ants under statutes that were held constitutional under the 
Roberts standard. However, the Crawford decision calls for 
reexamination of those statutes. 
 
II.  THE STATE STATUTES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH 
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE   
As this Part will show, these statutes are not without con-
troversy. Section A will show that the statements allowed un-
der these statutes are, in fact, testimonial. Section B demon-
strates that the statutes fail to provide an opportunity for 
meaningful cross-examination. Section C will argue that the 
statutes do not require a showing of unavailability. Section D 
will show that these statutes rely on the now obsolete Roberts 
standard. Finally, Section E will argue that the statutes allow 
judges to improperly invade the province of the jury. 
 
 111. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. at 945–46. 
 114. MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES, CRIMINAL 3.12 (Minn. Dist. 
Judges Ass’n, 5th ed. 2006); see also JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CRIMI-
NAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 105 (Jud. Council of Cal. 2013) (“You are the sole 
judges of the believability of a witness and the weight to be given to the testi-
mony of each witness.”). 
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A. THE TYPES OF STATEMENTS THAT THESE STATUTES ALLOW 
ARE TESTIMONIAL 
In order to trigger a Crawford analysis, the statements at 
issue must be testimonial.115 The three categories of “testimoni-
al” that Crawford laid out included (1) ex parte in-court testi-
mony, (2) formalized extrajudicial statements, and (3) state-
ments made to be a substitute for in-court testimony.116
For the third category, Crawford looks at the intent of the 
witness to determine whether a statement was given for the 
purpose of creating a substitute for in-court testimony.
 
Initially, it would seem child-victim statements do not apply to 
any of the three categories. They are neither ex parte in-court 
testimony nor are they formalized extrajudicial statements.  
117 Since 
it is difficult to imagine a child-victim understanding that he is 
giving statements for such a substitute, it follows that the third 
category also does not apply. However, in the Bryant decision, 
it appears that the Court shifted the focus of the primary pur-
pose test from the witness to the questioner.118 In this instance, 
the purpose for gathering the statements is to create a substi-
tute for in-court testimony because the police are searching for 
information identifying the attacker with the intention to use it 
at trial.119 At least one federal court has determined, without 
ruling on the facial validity of the statute, that it is “absolutely 
clear” that such evidence is testimonial.120
B. THE STATUTES FAIL TO REQUIRE A MEANINGFUL 
OPPORTUNITY FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION 
 Given the apparent 
evolution in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, there likely 
will be an ongoing conflict as law enforcement and prosecutors 
continue using statements of young witnesses obtained during 
investigations as a proxy for live testimony. 
Having established that hearsay is in fact testimonial, 
Crawford and its progeny will not allow admission of the 
statements unless the state can show both that (1) the witness 
 
 115. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (“[The Confronta-
tion Clause] applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those 
who ‘bear testimony.’”). 
 116. Id. at 51–52. 
 117. See id. at 52. 
 118. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1154–55 (2011). 
 119. See supra Part I.C (detailing state statutes permitting substitutes for 
in-court testimony). 
 120. See Bobadilla v. Carlson, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1104 (D. Minn. 2008). 
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is unavailable and (2) that there was a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.121 The Minnesota and California statutes 
seem to violate the fundamental right of cross-examination by 
allowing the admission of testimonial hearsay without requir-
ing the witness to testify, so long as there is corroboration of 
the act and the witness is unavailable.122 The Wisconsin statute 
complies with the requirement for cross-examination facially,123
State v. Snider provides an interesting example of how 
Wisconsin’s cross-examination requirement may be entirely 
cosmetic and not provide a defendant a true opportunity to con-
front the witness against him.
 
but it arguably does not comply with the requirement substan-
tively.  
124 In that case, the prosecutor 
decided to play the taped victim’s taped statement only after 
she was unable to recall the specific details that she had re-
ported on the tape.125
Since these statutes do not provide criminal defendants 
with a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses 
against them, they fail to comply with the Confrontation 
Clause. 
 The defendant can hardly be said to have 
had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness when the wit-
ness was unable to recall the details admitted as evidence in 
the taped statement. In such a circumstance, the defendant is 
unable to make the witness answer for any inconsistencies or 
flaws in her story because the witness is able to simply assert 
lack of memory and allow the tape to stand as uncontroverted 
evidence.  
C. THE STATUTES DON’T REQUIRE A SHOWING OF 
UNAVAILABILITY 
Crawford and its progeny are predicated not only on the 
notion that the out-of-court statement must be testimonial in 
nature, but also on the notion that the declarant must be una-
vailable to testify and must have undergone cross-
 
 121. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  
 122. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360(a)(3) (West Supp. 2014); MINN. STAT. 
§ 595.02, subdiv. 3 (2013). But corroboration does nothing to satisfy the fun-
damental right of cross-examination. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69. 
 123. See WIS. STAT. § 908.08(1) (2012) (stating that a court “may admit into 
evidence the . . . recording . . . of a child who is available to testify”). 
 124. State v. Snider, 668 N.W.2d 784 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003). 
 125. Id. at 788. 
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examination.126 As noted above, the Minnesota and California 
statutes use the disjunctive, requiring either unavailability or 
cross-examination, so that, in the event that the victim has 
been cross-examined, unavailability is not required under the 
statutes.127 Furthermore, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled 
that the Wisconsin statute is an example of a hearsay exception 
that allows for admission of hearsay despite the availability of 
the declarant.128 It is self-evident that the defendant was una-
ble to cross-examine the videotape in Snider. If the child was 
unable to recall the details played on tape, then the defendant 
also did not have a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine 
the declarant.129 That issue was raised and defeated in People v. 
Harless since the child was physically present in the court-
room.130
D. INAPPROPRIATENESS OF THE COURT DETERMINING THE 
“INDICIA-OF-RELIABILITY”: SHADES OF ROBERTS 
 However, the United States Supreme Court would like-
ly disagree that a child unable to discuss the details being 
played on tape could be meaningfully cross-examined because 
the defendant lacks an opportunity to confront the witness with 
any logical inconsistencies in the testimony.  
In addition to the Confrontation Clause problems inherent 
in the state statutes, the statutes also improperly imbue judges 
with the authority to make credibility determinations that 
should be made by the jury. This is not necessarily a constitu-
tional concern, but rather a problem that implicates a funda-
mental component of the jury system. 
All three of the statutes examined131
 
 126. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
 contain similar crite-
ria for what the judge should consider in order to determine 
whether out-of-court statements should be admitted. They all 
empower the judge to look to the “time, content, and circum-
 127. Supra Part II.B. 
 128. See State v. Tarantino, 458 N.W.2d 582, 589 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 
 129. Ironically, the child’s inability to recall the details of her attack, while 
dooming the admissibility of the evidence by failing the “cross-examination” 
prong of the Crawford test, potentially simultaneously satisfies the “unavaila-
bility” prong of the test because under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a wit-
ness unable to recall sufficient details can be deemed to be “unavailable.” FED. 
R. EVID. 804(a)(3) (stating that a witness is unavailable if the witness testifies 
to “not remembering the subject matter”); see also United States v. Owens, 484 
U.S. 554, 562 (1988) (showing that certain circumstances can “undermine the 
process” of cross-examination, rendering it less than meaningful). 
 130. People v. Harless, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 636–37 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 131. Supra Part I.C. 
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stances” of the statements in order to determine whether the 
statements bear an “indicia of reliability,”132 meaning the judge 
is weighing the credibility of the statements. Some might argue 
that the Federal Rules of Evidence allow these determina-
tions.133 However, this type of language seems to be predicated 
on the rejected Roberts framework. In fact, the “indicia of relia-
bility” language found in the statutes is essentially the same 
language used in Roberts134 yet specifically rejected in the 
Crawford decision.135
E. INVADING THE PROVINCE OF THE JURY 
  
Weighing of credibility is the role of the jury.136 Under 
Crawford, the jury’s ability to observe the witness under cross-
examination is the only legitimate method of assessing witness 
credibility.137 Indeed, the Eighth Circuit upheld the propriety of 
an instruction telling the jury that it weighs the credibility of 
witnesses and approved an extra instruction saying that the ju-
ry alone was responsible for making that credibility determina-
tion, even in the case of child-witnesses.138
A brief hypothetical illustrates the problems inherent in al-
lowing judges to substitute their judgment for that of the jury 
when making credibility determinations of witness statements. 
Assume a situation where a child reluctantly gave a recorded 
 When judges start 
making these determinations, they improperly invade the prov-
ince of the jury and undermine a bedrock principle of the crim-
inal justice system. 
 
 132. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360(a)(3) (West Supp. 2014); MINN. STAT. 
§ 595.02, subdiv. 3(a) (2013); WIS. STAT. § 908.08(1) (2012). 
 133. See FED. R. EVID. 807 (requiring “equivalent circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness”).  
 134. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
 135. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (“[W]e decline to mine 
the record in search of indicia of reliability.”). 
 136. See, e.g., EIGHTH CIRCUIT MANUAL, supra note 12, § 3.04 (“In deciding 
what the facts are, you may have to decide what testimony you believe and 
what testimony you do not believe. You may believe all of what a witness said, 
or only part of it, or none of it.”) (emphasis added). 
 137. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69 (“Where testimonial statements are 
at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional de-
mands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”). 
 138. See United States v. Butler, 56 F.3d 941, 945 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[Y]ou 
are the sole judge of the credibility of a child who testifies. You may consider 
not only the child’s age, but . . . whether the child impresses you as having an 
accurate memory and recollection, whether the child impresses you as a truth-
telling individual, and any other facts and circumstances which impress you 
as significant in determining the credibility of the child.”). 
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statement regarding an alleged sexual assault. The child might 
be reluctant because he or she is ashamed and confused about 
what happened. On the other hand, the child may have fabri-
cated the event for some reason and now does not want to con-
tinue lying. When considering the reliability of the statement, 
the judge would have to weigh both of these possibilities before 
reaching a decision. However, if the judge decides the state-
ments are reliable, then the possible inference that the child 
was reluctant because the story was not true, and the circum-
stances supporting that inference, are not presented to the ju-
ry. The jury then has to make a credibility determination about 
the out-of-court testimony without the benefit of all of the rele-
vant information about the circumstances of the statement it-
self. Reliability cannot realistically be separated from credibil-
ity, but that is exactly the scenario that the exemplar statutes, 
as currently written, force upon the courts. 
This problem can also be seen in Tarantino, where the trial 
court actually found that most of the factors it used to assess 
reliability did not support admitting the statements.139 Howev-
er, the court decided to admit them anyway because of the na-
ture of the crime and the close relationship between the victim 
and the defendant, and because showing the video would re-
duce the victim’s exposure.140 Although the statements were 
admitted, it was the judge rather than the jury that considered 
the reliability factors.141 The jury consequently had to make a 
credibility determination without the benefit of direct live tes-
timony.142
The statutes discussed in this Note are problematic for a 
variety of reasons. They permit testimonial hearsay, fail to re-
quire a meaningful opportunity for cross-examination, do not 
require a showing of unavailability, rely on an overturned Su-
preme Court doctrine, and improperly invade the province of 
the jury.  
  
 
 139. State v. Tarantino, 458 N.W.2d 582, 587 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 585. 
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III.  HOW THE STATUTES COULD BE REDRAFTED 
CONSISTENT WITH CURRENT JUDICIAL PRINCIPLES 
AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE   
Having demonstrated that the statutes at issue are prob-
lematic both from a perspective of Confrontation Clause juris-
prudence143 as well as when viewed in terms of the traditional 
role of the jury,144
A. REWRITE THE CHILD-VICTIM PROTECTION STATUTES TO 
SPECIFICALLY ALLOW FOR THE USE OF LIVE TWO-WAY VIDEO 
TESTIMONY 
 this Note next addresses how to revise the 
statutes to make them consistent with those principles. Section 
A describes how the statutes could be revised to allow for the 
use of live, two-way video testimony. Section B proposes that 
the statutes could be rewritten to be consistent with the Craw-
ford line of decisions. Section C concludes that the former op-
tion would better balance the competing interests in this con-
tentious issue.  
The cases and statutes discussed above illustrate constitu-
tional problems inherent in admitting out-of-court statements. 
Is there a way to protect the child-victims without depriving 
criminal defendants the right to confront their accusers? 
Closed-circuit television provides such an alternative. It can al-
low for cross-examination of a young witness during trial, thus 
allowing a jury to see the child testifying and assess the child’s 
credibility, while at the same time protecting the child-witness 
from having to experience a face-to-face encounter with his or 
her alleged assailant. 
Minnesota state courts have had opportunities to assess 
the statute allowing the use of closed-circuit television145 as a 
way to shield child-victims from face-to-face confrontation with 
their alleged assailants while still protecting the Confrontation 
rights of the accused. In State v. Ross, the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals considered a situation where a man was charged with 
sexual abuse against his girlfriend’s daughter.146
 
 143. Supra Part II.A–C. 
 There, the 
child-victim began her testimony in the courtroom but had to 
resume her testimony via two-way video because she became 
scared when asked about the defendant while she was in the 
 144. Supra Part II.D–E. 
 145. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subdiv. 4(c)(2) (2013). 
 146. State v. Ross, 451 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
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courtroom.147 The court upheld the use of the video testimony 
and said that it did not violate the defendant’s Confrontation 
rights because it came with a “particularized finding” that con-
fronting her accuser face to face would cause further trauma to 
the child.148
Other jurisdictions also allow live, two-way video testimo-
ny. In 2009, the New York Court of Appeals heard an appeal 
from a case where the New York Supreme Court allowed an 
adult complainant to testify in an assault case via two-way vid-
eo because he lived out of state and his health would have 
made traveling to New York to testify difficult.
  
149 In that case, 
the court upheld the conviction, finding that live, two-way video 
testimony upheld testimonial reliability required by the Con-
frontation Clause because there was “an individualized deter-
mination that denial of physical, face-to-face confrontation is 
necessary to further an important public policy.”150
The statutes could be saved from Confrontation Clause vio-
lations if, instead of excusing the child from testifying, they in-
stead allowed the child the protection of live two-way video tes-
timony. While such a scheme would not prevent the child from 
having to revisit the traumatic experience, it would at least 
prevent the child from undergoing the trauma of meeting his or 
her alleged attacker face to face.
 
151
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has ruled that live two-
way video testimony does not violate a defendant’s Confronta-
tion rights.
 At the same time, the de-
fendant would have a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine 
(or “confront”) his or her accuser.  
152
 
 147. Id. at 233–34. 
 However, there is a question whether the Su-
preme Court would find two-way video testimony to be an ap-
propriate substitute for face-to-face confrontation. In 1988, the 
Court overturned a conviction of a man charged with sexually 
 148. Id. at 235 (ruling that a finding that the child was scared to be in the 
presence of the defendant was sufficient to establish that the child would be 
traumatized if forced to face her assailant). 
 149. People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1100 (N.Y. 2009). 
 150. Id. at 1102 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 151. See Julie Oseid, Note, Defendants’ Rights in Child Witness Competen-
cy Hearings: Establishing Constitutional Procedures for Sexual Abuse Cases, 
69 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1384–85 (1985) (“[R]etelling the story is like another 
assault, because the traumatic incident must constantly be relived and re-
membered.”). 
 152. See Ross, 451 N.W.2d at 234–35. 
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assaulting two thirteen-year-old girls.153 The trial court com-
mitted reversible error when, pursuant to an Iowa statute,154 it 
allowed the victim-witnesses to testify through a special screen 
designed to shield them from their alleged assailant.155 The 
Court held that the Confrontation Clause ensured defendants 
the right to face-to-face confrontation because a witness would 
find it more difficult to lie when that witness has to testify face 
to face with his or her alleged assailant.156 However, the Court 
did note that one of the factors that weighed against the state 
was that the statute presumed child-victims would find facing 
their assailants to be a traumatizing experience. The Court in-
dicated an exception to the Confrontation Clause would require 
more particularized findings supporting the necessity of the 
shield.157
So long as such findings were provided for in some kind of 
hearing, courts would likely find two-way video testimony to be 
an appropriate method of testimony for child victim-witnesses 
for several reasons. First, in evaluating the need for two-way 
video, the judge would simply be assessing likelihood of trauma 
while leaving credibility determinations in the hands of the ju-
ry. Additionally, the Coy Court declined to ban outright stat-
utes that provided for shielding of crime victims from their ac-
cusers.
 This potentially leaves the door open for courts to al-
low alternatives to physical face-to-face testimony in the event 
of a particularized finding of trauma to the child victim-
witness. 
158 The Supreme Court, however, did articulate the 
objectives of the Confrontation Clause as allowing the defend-
ant to look at the witnesses, cross-examine the witnesses, and 
impeach the witnesses.159
 
 153. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1012 (1988). 
 Based on those objectives, courts 
should be expected to uphold the use of two-way video testimo-
ny. Unlike the protective sheet at issue in Coy, live video testi-
mony allows for the defendant and the jury to see the witness. 
The defendant’s counsel also has an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness, and defense counsel can impeach the wit-
 154. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West 1987). 
 155. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020. 
 156. Id. at 1019–20. 
 157. Id. at 1021. 
 158. Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court did distinguish from Coy a case involv-
ing two-way video testimony and found it permissible because it did have par-
ticularized findings supporting the important policy of protecting the child-
victim susceptible to trauma. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990). 
 159. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017. 
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ness. Therefore, the Supreme Court would likely be more recep-
tive to live, two-way video testimony than it was to protective 
sheets.  
Critics might argue that by putting children in a two-way 
video setup, they are still being placed in a traumatic setting. 
To some extent, that cannot be helped. The adversarial system 
requires confrontation as a protection of defendants’ rights. In-
sulating a witness from having to face his or her assailant in a 
live setting is as much protection as can be offered without de-
priving the defendant of one of the Constitution’s protections. 
However, by saving these victims from the live setting, the vic-
tims are protected by the knowledge that their assailant is only 
appearing on a TV screen, and there is no opportunity for direct 
physical contact between assailant and victim. 
There are several benefits to allowing this form of testimo-
ny, which successfully balances the interests of both the ac-
cused and the victims of crimes. The defendant would have an 
opportunity to test the veracity of the accuser’s claims and be 
able to expose any motives for dishonesty. The jury would be 
able to gauge the child-witness’s facial expression and tone of 
voice to determine whether or not it finds the testimony to be 
credible. And, most importantly, it would be the jury making 
that determination. 
B. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE STATUTES TO NON-
TESTIMONIAL HEARSAY 
In addition to providing for a new mechanism for child tes-
timony, legislatures should amend the statutes to apply only to 
specific types of out-of-court statements. They should begin by 
including the word “non-testimonial” every time they refer to 
the statements. Since testimonial hearsay is inadmissible,160 
the statutes would clear one constitutional hurdle if the draft-
ers made it clear that the statutes applied only to non-
testimonial hearsay. This would be constitutionally permissible 
because courts may freely apply various rules of evidence to 
hearsay that is non-testimonial.161
 
 160. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
 The statutes can draw this 
same line between “testimonial” and “non-testimonial” hearsay, 
allowing judges to make the more difficult distinction between 
the two, and allowing the statutes to evolve in accordance with 
the definitions handed down by the Supreme Court. 
 161. See id. at 61 (“[W]e apply the Confrontation Clause only to testimonial 
statements, leaving the remainder to regulation by hearsay law . . . .”). 
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Critics might label this approach as unduly formalistic, es-
pecially given the ill-defined concept of “testimonial hearsay.”162 
Saying that the statutes would only apply to “non-testimonial 
statements” would not be appreciably different from saying 
that “this statute only applies to situations where it comports 
with the Constitution.” Those critics might argue that statutory 
language should say that statements made in a formal inter-
view with a police officer, in a police station, or arranged by a 
police officer are not admissible. However, given the evolving 
nature of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, it would be more 
prudent to simply say “non-testimonial” and allow the statutes 
to evolve alongside the case law. These changes would be con-
sistent with Davis’s primary purpose test163 by preventing the 
admission of statements made at the behest of police officers in 
the course of their investigation for the purpose of creating ad-
missible evidence. Furthermore, these changes would also sat-
isfy Bullcoming’s formality test164
Critics might also assert that statements made in order to 
create evidence to aid in prosecution or statements that were 
responses to questions asked for the same purpose are in viola-
tion of Bryant.
 by banning statements at set-
tings that the Supreme Court finds to be too formal of a setting 
in order for the evidence to be admissible.  
165
The distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial 
statements would be a question of law for the judge to decide, 
but the jury should be able to analyze and give weight to any 
evidence regarding the reliability of the statements. In order to 
preserve the proper role of the jury,
 They would want the statute to explicitly say 
that no statement shall be admitted if an objectively reasonable 
person would think it was made for evidentiary use in criminal 
prosecution or in response to questions asked for such an evi-
dentiary purpose. This would presumably compel judges to ap-
ply the reasonable person standard when making admissibility 
decisions rather than trusting trial judges to correctly apply all 
of the standards from the convoluted Crawford progeny. How-
ever, once again, this would preclude courts from being able to 
adjust to the ever-expanding line of cases dealing with Confron-
tation Clause jurisprudence.  
166
 
 162. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing various interpretations). 
 the statute should re-
 163. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
 164. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011). 
 165. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1147–48 (2011). 
 166. See EIGHTH CIRCUIT MANUAL, supra note 12, § 3.04. 
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quire that the evidence regarding the “time, content, and cir-
cumstances”167
In contrast to objections that the proposed revisions do not 
go far enough to comport the statutes with modern Confronta-
tion Clause jurisprudence, other critics might claim the added 
restrictions would make it too difficult to admit out-of-court 
statements and thus fail to protect vulnerable child-victims. 
While these proposals would make it more difficult to prevent 
some witnesses from having to take the stand in potentially 
traumatic situations, if the statutes are not changed in order to 
make them consistent with Crawford, then no victims will be 
protected because they will all have to testify in person. There-
fore, by limiting the scope of these statutes, legislatures can 
continue to protect vulnerable child-victims while not running 
afoul of the Confrontation Clause.  
 of the statements be presented to the jury to aid 
them in making their credibility determinations. This way, the 
judge would not merely inform the jury that the court has de-
termined the statements are reliable because of the circum-
stances under which they are given. Instead, the jury would be 
able to see the same evidence as the judge and use it to either 
agree with the court or determine that the statements are not 
inherently reliable. Whatever decision the jury makes, this rule 
would make the jury the sole judge of how much (if any) weight 
to give to the out-of-court statements. 
C. THE PREFERRED SOLUTION 
Considering both live, two-way video testimony and rewrit-
ing the statutes to limit their scope, the better solution would 
be to amend the statutes to allow for live, two-way video testi-
mony. The expansive definitions offered by Crawford and its 
progeny of what makes hearsay evidence “testimonial” would 
result in only a small amount of hearsay being admitted under 
the revised statutes. Therefore, prosecutors would frequently 
be left with the Hobson’s choice between putting the child-
victim on the stand to face their alleged attacker or trying to 
prosecute without the evidence. Allowing for live, two-way vid-
eo testimony would prevent them from having to face that 
choice.  
Advocates of the revisions limiting the scope of the statutes 
to non-testimonial hearsay might argue that live testimony 
 
 167. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360(a)(3) (West Supp. 2014); MINN. STAT. 
§ 595.02, subdiv. 3(a) (2013); WIS. STAT. § 908.08(1) (2012). 
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would be preferable to testimony on a video screen. Prosecutors 
likely would not disagree. This solution, however, does not 
mean that child-witnesses must testify through two-way video. 
Rather, it is simply an option if the prosecutor feels the child is 
not emotionally strong enough to testify in person. If the child 
is willing and able to testify live, that can be done—and will 
likely be more powerful testimony. But, if the prosecutor did 
not feel that was the case, prosecutors would have the added 
option of using closed-circuit television in order to balance the 
prosecutorial interests with the protection of vulnerable vic-
tims. Giving prosecutors that ability to balance their prosecuto-
rial interests with the need to protect the child-victims would 
help ensure that both interests are adequately protected.  
  CONCLUSION   
To protect child-victims of heinous crimes, many states 
have laws allowing those children to have out-of-court state-
ments admitted against their alleged assailants in criminal tri-
als. While the objective of these statutes is a noble one, it also 
disturbs the Confrontation rights of the defendants and im-
permissibly inserts judges into a credibility-weighing role ordi-
narily reserved for juries. It is important for legislatures, in 
their haste to protect sympathetic victims, not to forget that 
our criminal justice system also owes an important obligation 
to unsympathetic defendants. 
If states wanted to keep the children from having to testify 
at all, they could attempt to rewrite the statutes to be con-
sistent with Crawford and its progeny. However, the use of 
two-way video testimony to save children the trauma of face-to-
face confrontation would most effectively preserve the Confron-
tation rights of the accused while still protecting those children. 
 
